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Abstract—Criminals are increasingly using mobile based 
communication applications, like WhatsApp, that have end-to-
end encryption to connect to each other. This makes traditional 
analysis of call graphs, or traffic analysis, virtually impossible 
and so is a hindrance for law enforcement personnel. Old 
methods of traffic analysis have been rendered useless and 
criminals, including arms dealers and terrorists, are able to 
engage in criminal activity undetected by police. At present, law 
enforcement must use extensive manual effort to parse data 
provided by cell companies to extract information. We have built 
a system that analyses cellular GPRS metadata and builds a 
profile and finds potential call connections explicitly which are 
implicit in the dataset. This paper describes our approach and 
system in detail and includes results of our evaluation using an 
anonymized dataset from Delhi Police. Our system permits call 
graph analysis to be done, and significantly reduces the time 
needed from the data analysis process.  
Keywords—mobile traffic analysis, call graph, GPRS CDR 
data, profile 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In the past few years, people all over the world have rapidly 
adopted Internet based messaging applications, like WhatsApp 
[5], Facebook Messenger[4], Rakuten Viber [5], WeChat [7] 
etc., because of the cost savings they provide. Today over a 
billion people are using these messaging service to connect 
within and outside their social network. According to Statista 
[11], WhatsApp [5] is the most popular mobile messaging app 
in the world. Facebook Messenger [4] ranked second, followed 
by Chinese services QQ Mobile and WeChat [7]. Other 
popular messaging apps include Skype, Viber, LINE, BBM, 
Telegram and Kakaotalk. Facebook owns the top 2 mobile 
messaging apps – WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger. 
However, it is being increasingly observed  that criminals 
are also adopting these applications since they often provide 
end-to-end encryption that makes it difficult for law 
enforcement agencies to intercept them [1]. Traditional 
methods of mobile traffic analysis have been rendered useless 
due to the encryption and criminals are able to engage in 
criminal activity undetected by police. Specifically, given a 
potential criminal suspect, the law enforcement agencies have 
no way of identifying their network by analyzing the call graph 
generated from their mobile phones, since no phone calls are 
being made. WhatsApp, or other encrypted messaging services, 
are used instead.  
Governments in various countries have expressed concerns 
that encrypted messaging services can be a threat to national 
security as it can be used by terrorists and other criminals to 
harm the society [2][10]. Some countries are even changing 
laws requiring messaging service providers to provide law 
enforcement agencies with access to encrypted messages 
[8][9]. Hence, there is an urgent need to develop new 
techniques to analyze mobile phone logs to be able to connect 
potential actors in criminal activities who might be using 
encrypted messaging services for their criminal activities.  
Call Detail Records (CDR) and Internet Protocol Detail 
Records (IPDR) help track details of a telecommunication call 
or message generated by a phone device. These logs contain 
metadata that describe details of a specific call, like calling 
phone number, destination port, start date/time, end date/time 
etc. Law enforcement in Delhi has been analyzing CDR and 
IPDR logs to track potential criminals. This includes GPRS 
CDRs. While this specifically refers to 2G data related calls, 
we use the term loosely to describe all CDRs that cover “data” 
calls that provide the IP connectivity to the handset. However, 
the current process requires lot of manual effort and is a long 
and tedious process. Police must go through folders of data 
provided by cell companies to find one file of metadata. After 
this they must go through many lines of data, and extract 
information by hand. This information is typically limited to 
strings that indicate what website a suspect visited, or strings 
that might have been part of files locally opened etc. It does not 
include any attempt at constructing call graphs. 
We have developed a system that analyzes mobile Call 
Data Record (CDR) GPRS and IPDR datasets to generate a 
profile of the mobile user. It also correlates the mobile users 
with other users of the encrypted messaging service to make 
explicit the implicit call graphs in this data. Our key insight is 
the following. When two suspects are talking to each other on 
WhatsApp, analyzing their GPRS CDRs will reveal that both 
are connected to WhatsApp. The reverse is of course not true. 
Just because two people are connected to WhatsApp at the 
same time does not mean that they are talking to one another. 
However, the more two people are on WhatsApp at the same 
time, the higher the probability that they are talking to one 
another. This means that by correlating two GPRS CDRs, we 
can see how often two suspects are using the same service at 
the same time, and potentially inferring that they are connected 
to each other.  
This mobile dataset was obtained by anonymizing data of 
criminals collected by the special cell unit of Delhi Police [3]. 
No personally identifiable information (PII) data was included 
in the logs that were studied for this project. Hence, no prior 
information of the criminal’s profile was available for our 
system design. Our system significantly reduces the time from 
the data gathering and analysis process. 
In this paper, we describe our approach and the system in 
detail.  Section II describes the related work. Section III 
describes the system design approach and the results of our 
evaluation. Section IV describes planned future work that will 
better this software.. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. CDR Logs Analysis  
Teng and Chou [12] have proposed a graphical analytics 
approach to mining CDR logs to determine potential 
communities. Zhou et. al. [13] have analyzed CDRs to deduce 
social attribute from the calling behavior. However, this 
approach will not work on encrypted messaging services as 
the connection between the two users cannot be determined 
from the call logs. The only information the logs provide us is 
the port number of the application to which the mobile user 
connected.  
 
B. WhatsApp Messaging Application  
Anglano [17] in his analysis used many types of artifacts 
generated on devices by WhatsApp in correlation to find 
pieces of information like contact lists, chronology of 
messages, deleted contacts, and deleted messages. This 
information could not be gathered by analyzing these artifacts 
on their own. This research was limited to Android devices. 
Researchers have also reviewed encrypted messaging 
applications, like WhatsApp to study their impact on human 
behavior. Montag et. al. [15] conducted demographic analysis 
of WhatsApp usage. They observed that WhatsApp is about 
20% of a typical daily smartphone usage and females, younger 
people, and those with extraversion tend to use it more than 
others. The study was conducted by collecting data directly 
through the subjects’ smartphone and analyzing said data. 
Church et. al. [16] have compared benefits of WhatsApp with 
traditional SMS technology for mobile communication. These 
studies have however been limited to mobile data and not 
CDR logs. 
 
C. Mobile Data Analysis for Networks  
Researchers have analyzed and correlated mobile data logs 
to determine social networks. Eagle et. al. [14] demonstrated 
that friendships can be predicted based on the observational 
mobile data alone, where friend dyads demonstrate distinctive 
temporal and spatial patterns in their physical proximity and 
calling patterns.  
 
III. SYSTEM DESIGN 
Our system consists of three main components – as first 
step it generates the persona or profile of the mobile phone 
user. The process of this component is illustrated in Figure 1 
and described in section III. A. The second system component 
generates a log correlating two mobile user logs and 
determining if they were connecting via encrypted messaging 
services. Figure 2 illustrates this process that is detailed in 
section III B. The third component focuses on WhatsApp [5] 
application usage by the mobile user and generates daily and 
weekly trend graphs from the IPDR logs. We have developed 
this system using Python 3.7 programming language. 
The dataset available to us included the information listed 
in Table 1. We used all the fields for our analysis. Fields 
DESTPORT and MSISDN were the most important fields for 
our analysis along with the instance date and time fields. 
A. Persona Generation 
The first component of our system generates the persona or 
profile of the mobile user. This is derived from the GPRS 
metadata files. Figure 1 illustrates the various steps of the 
persona generation process. We also detail these steps below: 
Step 1: The program is formatted to accept CSV files, so 
all input files must be in CSV format. The first part of the 
program opens the file using a with loop. 
 
Figure 1: Persona Generation Process 
TABLE I.  CDR METADATA FIELDS 
Metadata field Description 
PRIVATEIP IP Address of the Mobile Device 
PRIVATEPORT Port of the Mobile Device 
PUBLICIP Public IP Address presented by the 
Mobile Device 
PUBLICPORT Public Port presented by the Mobile 
Device 
DESTIP IP Address of the record Destination 
DESTPORT Port of the record destination 
MSISDN Mobile Station International Subscriber 
Directory Number -  number used to 
identify a mobile phone number 
internationally 
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity number can identify the user of 
a mobile network 
START_DATE, 
START_TIME 
Record Start date and Time 
END_DATE, END_TIME Record End Date and Time 
IMEI International Mobile Equipment 
Identity Number that can uniquely 
identify the mobile phone 
CELL_ID ID of the Cell Tower 
UPLINK_VOLUME Amount of data Upload 
DOWNLINK_VOLUME Amount of data Downloaded 
TOTAL_VOLUME Total volume of the Data 
I_RATTYPE Identifies whether it is 2G Data or 3G 
Data 
 
Step 2 : After opening the file, program cross references 
the destination ports. A vital part of this project is the 
destination port. The destination port is needed to figure out 
what exactly the suspect is doing on the Wi-Fi. One major 
obstacle that presented itself was linking destination ports to a 
destination.  
Step 2A: In the traditional method, the law enforcement 
analyst manually extracted all possible destination ports from 
the data. This was a time consuming process as over nine 
thousand points of data were analyzed, and destination ports 
were repeated many times. After this tedious process, one had 
to link each unique port to a destination. This proved to be the 
most challenging part, as there is no central database in the 
public domain with all of the ports and their associations. The 
process required us to manually browse through multiple 
websites, some which were helpful and some which were not. 
Sites that frequently came up were question and answer 
websites, such as Quora, and Yahoo Answers. For the different 
applications, we had to manually identify where each port lead 
to.  
Step 2B: Using the identified ports, we created lists of the 
major applications that were frequently accessed. These 
included WhatsApp, iTunes/QuickTime, Microsoft/Games, 
and Web access via HTTP and HTTPS. Table II lists all the 
ports and their corresponding applications that were identified 
by us. 
 Step 3: The next part identifies the precise destination. Our 
program runs a reverse DNS search to find the site that was 
accessed. This is accomplished using the destination IP. If the 
search is successful, the system returns the web address 
accessed by the person. Otherwise, the destination IP is 
returned.  
 Step 4: The next step was to link each port to a destination. 
Earlier in the process, the ports had already been cross 
referenced, this step linked each port which existed in the 
program’s dictionary to a destination (see Table II). 
 Step 5: The last step outputs all of the information to a text 
file in a format that is readable by the user. This output file is 
used to generate the User profile graph from the data 
processed. We illustrate such a profile chart in section IV (see 
Figure 4).  
B. Correlating Callers 
The second component of our system determines the 
correlation between two mobile users by reviewing their CDR 
logs and determining the time when the two were potentially 
accessing the same messaging application. Figure 2 illustrates 
the process of correlating two mobile callers. 
 The steps followed by the system to identify the connected 
mobile users are detailed below: 
 
 Figure 2: Process to build Correlation File 
 Step 1: To find connections between any two mobile users, 
we begin with the GPRS metadata files of the users. The files 
are converted into CSV format and then inputted into the 
system program.  
Step 2: The next step is to establish if two events in the GPRS 
file have the same destination port. All the instances in the two 
files with the same destination port are identified. 
TABLE II.  PORT AND  APPLICATION LIST 
Destination 
Port 
Description / Protocol Destination 
Application 
Application 
Vendor 
5223 
 
WhatsApp Facebook Inc 
5228 
 
WhatsApp Facebook Inc 
4244 
 
WhatsApp Facebook Inc 
5222 
 
WhatsApp Facebook Inc 
5242  
 
WhatsApp Facebook Inc 
443  TCP Skype Microsoft Inc 
3478-3481  UDP Skype Microsoft Inc 
49152-65535  UDP+TCP Skype Microsoft Inc 
80, 8080 
 
Web 
Connection 
 
443 Secure Sockets Layer Web 
Connection 
 
8081 McAfee E-Policy 
Orchestrator Black Ice Cap 
Web 
Connection 
 
993, 143 
 
IMAP 
 
8024, 8027, 
8013, 8017, 
8003, 7275, 
8025, 8009 
Apple iTunes music iTunes  Apple Inc. 
58128, 51637, 
61076 
Apple Inc.'s storage area 
network (SAN) or clustered 
file system for macOS. 
Xsan Apple Inc. 
    
40020, 40017, 
40023, 40019, 
40001, 40004, 
40034, 40031, 
40029, 40005, 
40026, 40008, 
40032 
 
Microsoft 
Various 
Online Games 
Microsoft Inc. 
 
Step 3: The next part involves determining that the time 
difference is within the specified threshold. We calculate the 
difference between the start times of events in the two files that 
have the same destination port. If the time difference is within 
the specified threshold, then the program will mark the two as 
a connection. The threshold time range can be changed at the 
analyst request.  
Step 4: The next part is to find out on what application the 
two people were on at the same time. This is done by linking 
the destination port to a destination, this is done by referencing 
the dictionary of ports that was established earlier in table II. 
Step 5: Once these details are gathered, the system appends 
them to a file. Figure 3 illustrates this output file generated by 
comparing some CDR logs of two mobile callers. We provide 
details about how often connections were made and what 
fractions of connections were in common. The analyst can 
provide a threshold above which this degree of common 
connectivity can be assumed to be a connection. There are 
clear tradeoffs between false positives and false negatives here, 
and the choice is a function of the tradecraft of the analyst or 
the policies of the organization.  
C. Caller’s WhatsApp Usage Trends 
The third component of our system generates the trends of 
WhatsApp usage by a mobile user by analyzing their IPDR 
logs. This component looks at one or more files to generate 
usage trends only for WhatsApp application. With one input 
file of IPDR data, the system creates two output files of results. 
One file, a text file, lists all the individual connections. The 
second, a csv file, has a break down for the day based on three-
hour intervals (i.e. 12am – 3 am). When a directory is inputted 
into this component, the only result is a csv file with a 
breakdown of usage trends within three-hour intervals. 
Like the other components of the system, in this component 
too an individual record is identified as a WhatsApp 
connection using the destination port. If the destination port in 
a record is a valid WhatsApp port number (see table II), then it 
is analyzed further. To provide trends for a three-hour interval, 
the start time of the record is compared with the time intervals 
and placed within the correct one. The time intervals are 
logged in their own CSV file which can be further analyzed if 
 
 
Figure 2: Process to build Correlation File 
needed (see figures 8 and 9). In the appropriate case, the rest of 
the details are logged in a separate text file (see figure 7). 
IV. SYSTEM EVALUATION 
For evaluating our system design, we used the anonymized 
dataset provided by Delhi Police. This data consisted of CDR 
and IPDR logs of potential criminals being tracked by the law 
enforcement agencies.  
The results of the persona generation component of our 
system is illustrated in Table III and Figure 4. It gives an 
analyst a quick sense of what the suspect is spending time on, 
what their interests might be etc.  
TABLE III.  PERSONA GENERATED FOR MOBILE USER 
Application Frequency Usage 
percent 
WhatsApp  1997 25.09 
iTunes/QuickTime 18 0.22 
Microsoft or was playing games  38 0.47 
Xsan File System 3 0.03 
Email 199 2.5 
Web via HTTPS 4983 62.6 
Web via HTTP 721 9.05 
 
The results of the User correlation generation component of 
our system is illustrated in figure 3 and figure 5. The figure 
shows how much time correlation takes in a worst-case 
situation, in this case, with all destination ports matching. Even 
Figure 3: Correlation Result file 
 
Figure 4: User Profile generated by the system 
 
Figure 5: User Connections results generated by the system 
 
with 200 data points, it takes about a second. Using the chart 
editor on Google sheets, we found the equation for the 
trendline of the data in Figure 6. It is a linear equation. 
However, since we’ve naively implemented correlation, we 
expected the big Oh scaling to be n2.  
 To validate the accuracy of our work, we manually 
correlated the data, and then checked those results against the 
results generated by the system. This was done under multiple 
different scenarios. The base case was anonymized data from a 
real suspect’s GPRS dump. This was used to create another 
synthetic GPRS dump which had no common usage with the 
real suspect dump. This created the first test, and as expected, 
the system found no overlap. We then created a series of test 
cases with varying degrees of constructed “overlap”. The 
overlap was also manually verified. This was then compared 
against the output of our program, and it was found to confirm 
in each case 
 
Figure 6: Performance Trends of the correlation 
 
The results of the WhatsApp trends component of our system 
is illustrated in figures 7,8 and 9. The system output identifies 
that a connection is being made to WhatsApp based on the 
port number . (Illustrated in figure 7). Figure 8 illustrates the 
graphical output for WhatsApp usage for a week by day and 
figure 9 for WhatsApp trends for a week by Time of the day. 
These graph were found to be very relevant by the law 
enforcement agencies to determine the time when a suspect is 
active on the messaging application and help build his profile. 
 
 
Figure 9: WhatsApp Usage for a week based on Time of Day 
  
To the best of our knowledge, there are no similar programs 
that are available publicly. Such programs might exist 
internally with law enforcement or intelligence communities, 
but they are not discussed in the public domain.  
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have described the system we developed to 
generate a profile of a mobile user based on their GPRS CDR 
metadata. We also developed a technique to determine 
potential connection between two mobile users based on 
simultaneous user access of an encrypted messaging service or 
other similar application ports. This is far less time-consuming 
than the manual methods in use currently. This system is very 
useful to the law enforcement agencies who are faced with the 
challenge of monitoring messaging applications that have end-
to-end encryption. Note that this is a proof of concept that 
demonstrates the power of our approach. Due to legalities 
associated with data access, we can’t directly test our system 
Figure 8: WhatsApp connections trend for a week based on day 
Figure 7: WhatsApp connections identified from the IPDR log  
on multiple real data sets. However, our code has recently been 
turned over to Delhi Police, who plan to use it in their work. 
 As part of our on-going work, we are also developing a 
user-friendly graphical interface for our system. In the future, 
we plan to enhance this system to allow analysis of other data 
sets such as Internet Protocol Data Records, IPDRs. We also 
plan to make some features such as the reverse DNS search 
optional in an effort to shorten the time taken by the user 
persona builder.  
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